Monday 28 April 2014

Constructivism and the International Society of States

Constructivism 

‘anarchy is what states make of it”[1]


Alexander Wendt, political IR theorist, is one of the core social constructivist theorists behind the observation that states have a common interest in establishing and maintaining international order under the veil of international non-governmental organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Such NGO’s can thus act as said veil and provide coercive tactics from the society of states in question and will thus be harder to be perceived as a direct threat to sovereignty as the legitimacy of their actions are backed by the international community.

For instance, the NATO lead intervention in Libya can be understood using the concept of the international society. The coalition of forces and their military intervention as sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council, while experiencing some protest, went mostly unabated in their mission to stabilise the nation and ensure civilians went unharmed as Muammar Ghaddafi’s administration went to the dogs. The international society of states' actions in Libya were thus legitimised by the international community, and due to the collective agreement that intervention should be undertaken, states' cooperation on said matter became simplified. Consequently, the intervention undertaken can therefore be directly interpreted as a collective and agreed upon attack on a nations sovereignty with hopes in further securing energy exports, and the overall stability of the Middle East, in so far as Libya’s position can provide.


Furthermore the coercive nature of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is a result of the international society of states economic prowess as per the Washington Consensus and strong-arm tactics within developing nations. Unilateral trade liberalisations and currency devaluations come at the price of outflows of capital into the nations in question, and thus the economic opening and exploitation by that of the western and far more wealthy counterparts can be undertaken. For example, the power of trade sanctions and credit downgrades imposed on Russia in response to their intimidating economic tactics towards Ukraine can be viewed as a direct verification of the power of non-governmental organisations such as the IMF. The $15bn (US) aid package provided by the IMF to the Ukraine, while not explicitly coming at a price, comes with the implicit agreement that future cooperation with Ukraine and the European Union (EU) and other western nations will culminate. Therefore, as Alexander Wendt outlines, the powerful economic conditions in which the west and similar wealthy states can coordinate through legitimised international organisations remains to be amply powerful, and following the conceptions of the constructivist’s school of thought, the international community can increase their level of security and sovereignty through said channels without such increase coming at the expense of the other.


In conclusion, the manner in which states can affect their neighbours, and given that identities do remain constant as conceived by Wendt, can be exacerbated by their propensity to cooperate and coordinate coercively within the international community. The social constructivist theoretical framework provides an accurate scope in which to view the nature in which states coordinate with one another at the international level, and thus the manner in which they decide to hedge against other states in their ultimate battle for international hegemony.










[1] Wendt. 1992. Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. International Organization 46 (spring): 391-425.

Sunday 6 April 2014

The Pursuit of Wealth and Power

Complex Interdependence; friends or foes?



                   “In brief, political economy in this study means the reciprocal and dynamic interaction in international relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power.”[1]

The economic and subsequent political rise of China has already begun to alter the manner in which internal and external political policies are being made within the U.S.A. and other western nations. Political scientist Robert Keohane was among the first to coin the term complex interdependence in order to explain the transforming state of international relations within the increasingly globalised political economy. The rise of non-state actors such as corporations, non-governmental organisations and other conglomerates continue to change the face of the international system in creating a multifaceted environment in which factors such as trade balances, fiat currencies, and the reduction of tariffs on trade have become principal to economic and political well being.

With the demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the US dollar began to replace gold as the reserve peg and thus the accumulative stockpiling of the greenback commenced. Today, China lacking any reserve currency alternative and vehemently attempting to offset the appreciation of the Renminbi, maintains their immense reserves of the greenback whilst also purchasing U.S. government treasury bills, ironically (or not) funding their largest export market’s trade deficit and exponentially growing public and federal debt. The cohesive nature of the international financial system has created a system in which economic interdependence has become analogous with political cooperation among states as seen with China and the United States. If one or the other decides against the current status quo, changes will affect both sides regardless of who is the mightier. A cutback in T-bill purchases from China would see the U.S. unable to fund it’s debt and rates would rise causing a contraction in credit markets and ultimately, the economy as a whole. This in turn would affect demand for China’s products and a recession would thus cross international borders. As seen with the global financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis, the deepening of economic interdependence has linked states politically under the global financial umbrella.

Conversely, the open nature of globalised world markets has created a business environment in which corporations have been able to become borderless, and in some cases, wield more economic strength than already wealthy western states. Furthermore, with the growth of such multinational corporations and their accompanying lobbying power, it becomes clear that with respect to contentions of the liberal perspective of international relations, the complex nature of the system outweighs the simplistic assumptions of realist perspectives. Clearly states place within the international system have had their place eroded at the expense of international organisations and conglomerates who find themselves able to influence trade deals and internal politics in which they may influence. For instance, the auto-pact, a controversial trade agreement signed by the U.S. and Canada in 1965, while eliminating barriers to trade and (generally accepted to have) lowered final costs to consumers created a dichotomy with respect to blue collar jobs which remained in Canada and white collar corporate jobs such as research and development and management positions which saw its relocation to the United States. Neoliberal Institutionalism thus provides an accurate scope in which to view this particular relationship, the influence multinational corporations contained as their bargaining chip, as well as other situations similar to it across the current political landscape.


Contrary to realism’s take of the international system, neoliberal institutionalism highlights the ever increasing importance of economic and subsequent political integration and the manner in which this complex system is eliminating the scope of international anarchy. Decades ago, the rise of China would most likely be perceived as a much greater threat than it is today, and largely thanks to the fact that USA’s prosperity remains directly linked to that of China’s and vice versa. I find this approach to be a much more realistic interpretation of current international relations due to the fact that the complex system as described by Robert Keohane more accurately predicts the end goal of states and thus the method in which they find themselves interconnected within the pursuit of such goals. Economic prosperity and political freedom remain directly linked and the quest for both involve increased interdependence within states in order to achieve their competitive advantage, and consequent growth. It is important however to make the distinction between cooperation and harmony in this scenario. Robert Keohane accurately discerns this in his theory, while states will most likely never be fully cooperative in their lust for power and dominance, shared goals and the potential that economic integration offers has become paramount to political decisions within states. For this reason, I believe the international system to not be as unstable as realists perceive, and thus this stability can be attributed to the ever increasing levels of economic cooperation, and the growth of international bodies and the influence they excrete.




[1] Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation. Pg.43

Sunday 23 March 2014

The G-8 is still the old G-7 plus Russia

Structural Realism and annexation of the Crimean peninsula

Source

‘The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation’[i]


Thomas Hobbes hit the nail on the head when he ascribed the notion that a free and equal man would ultimately be drawn into competition and conflict with his neighbour. Pair this theory to the international political landscape and one draws a surprisingly efficient manner in which to understand decisions being made by states acting within the “state of nature” of international politics. For instance, Russia’s recent annexation of the Ukrainian Crimean peninsula verifies this ideology in terms of the greater geopolitical and economic implications at hand. In order to ensure the survival of the state (or to prohibit the erosion of), Russia’s military invasion was used in order to hedge against the powers of the west whose continual influence in former Soviet bloc states has been growing. Russia viewing this as an encroachment into their territory and an advance of the West’s front lines had no other option but to assert their maintained sovereignty over the Crimean peninsula. Structural realism thus remains evident as the Crimean conflict represents more of a proxy war between Russia and the west, specifically the USA. The conflict seen among these states is nothing more than an attempt in competition of both, wishing to hedge against the other, and specifically, of the periphery’s attempt to erode the supremacy of the United States of America, whose dominance has pulled away since the collapse of the USSR. Furthermore, China’s lack of interest in picking sides to further their “peaceful ascent” approach to a regional hegemonic power gives further credence this theory. It seems that while states are being more or less cooperative with the west, a steady rise in the east is coming at the expense of the once mighty west.

Russia although now undergoing economic stress due to economic sanctions from the west remains unconcerned, as it had been for many years presumably comfortable with its position as a vital exporter of energy within the EU and ailing beacon for crony capitalism. Consequently, owing to the economic importance of Ukraine (ie; passage to the rest of Europe for Russia’s oil exports) one would be hard pressed to assume Russia’s apathy concerning the stability and potential downfall of one of it’s economic arteries. Likewise, the strategic geo-political location of the Crimean peninsula with respect to the Black sea holds true to the same notion; military bases and strategic shipping lanes travelling to the Sea of Marmara and the Mediterranean are vital in terms of regional and hegemonic influence.
Furthermore, assuming that indeed there is no overarching higher authority governing the world (yea right UN), structural realism’s analysis functions in that it predicts the unabated annexation of Crimea. The continuing economic erosion of the United States of America at the hands of the Chinese and other regional hegemonies in Eurasia has been recreating the bi-polar international political landscape not seen since the existence of the USSR. Although many regard the cold war as a time of literal peace between the world’s superpowers, the fact remains that within the periphery, the occurrence was quite the opposite. Endless proxy wars such as that in Vietnam thus give credence to the structural realists perspective; state actors remain the most important components of international relations within the international arena. Russia’s annexation of Crimea can thus be seen as nothing more than an attempt to further hedge against the wests political swelling in Eastern Europe and the EU and for the most part is working well. The west’s stronghold on Eastern Europe while firm has been cast in doubt due to the inability to ensure a peaceful and diplomatic transition of Ukraine to the likes of the EU and greater cooperation with the west.
While sure I am of the Wests’ influence in this world (without a doubt a power to be reckoned with), I cannot help but imagine that USA’s return to a reclusive nation is only a matter of decades away. The lack of the wests intervention in Syria and now in Crimea only makes me believe that this erosion has begun to take place. International players such as Russia and China are beginning to understand their ability (whether economic or political) to influence the decisions of other states within the international arena. Additionally, to me the fact that China in a matter of years will overtake the GDP (PPP) of the USA and not to mention the potential to grow to fourfold over it only signifies a major shift in political and economic power to the east. This shift will most certainly have awakening consequences to the west and create another bipolar (or perhaps more) political landscape, one in which Russia will look to China and the East for direction.




[i] Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan. Ch13, para 7.